For an overlapping generations economy with varying life-cycle productivity, non-stationary endowments, continuous time starting at −∞ (hence allowing for full anticipation), constantreturns-to-scale production and CES utility we fully characterise equilibria where output is higher than investment, which is strictly positive. Net assets (aggregate savings minus the value of the capital stock) are constant in any equilibrium, and, for balanced growth equilibria (BGE, defined for an economy with stationary endowments), net assets are non-zero only in the golden rule equilibrium, in accord with [13] . The number of BGE is finite. Their parity, however, depends on the life-cycle productivity, in particular, on the relation between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the minimal working age and the minimal tax age.
Introduction
Consider the classical (Cass and Yaari [4] ) 1-commodity, 1 type of consumer overlapping generations (og) model with exogenous labour-saving technological growth, constant-returns-to-scale production function and time-separable ces utility. Time is the real line, individual life-span is [0, 1], labour is supplied inelastically as in [4] and, in addition, life-cycle productivity is a non-negative function of age, which could be taken, for instance, as 1 in the first half of life, and 0 in the second, as in Samuelson's model [22] . We add arbitrary endowments, in particular, lump-sum transfers, as a template for general policies, and give an easy characterisation of competitive equilibria, that allows in [20] to justify (and provide an algorithm for) comparative statics with respect to policies, this being our main goal.
Recent variations of Cass and Yaari's model either provide a partial characterisation for very specific cases (output linear in capital, [6] ; exchange economy with logarithmic preferences, [9] ) or are obscure, mixing the description of the economy with equilibrium conditions.
The main contribution of this paper is the characterisation of competitive equilibria based on the classical general equilibrium approach: avoiding any ad-hoc restrictions on equilibrium variables, and deriving all properties of prices and quantities (finiteness, positivity, continuity, differentiability, etc.) from the equilibrium (i.e., optimisation) conditions. To the best of our knowledge we provide the first careful equilibrium analysis of this model, especially for non-stationary transfers (endowments). In particular, our price equation, lemma 10.a4-a5, shows that the standard form of no-arbitrage condition, taken for granted in the literature, is, in general, incorrect and holds only for equilibria where capital is never zero; otherwise, prices might not be smooth.
Our analysis further allows for irreversibility constraints, which can generate inequality of equilibrium prices (for consumption and output, for example).
We also establish finiteness of the number of balanced growth equilibria (bge) (where the capital path is exponential), and that there is no 0-equilibrium: under mild conditions imposed on the production function, all bge are interior.
For endowment economies (with discrete time starting from zero) the number of stationary equilibria is known to be finite: [15, 3] . Gale [13] , who analysed a discrete-time pure-exchange og economy, demonstrated it has two types of equilibria: balanced ones (where net savings equal the value of the capital stock) and the golden rule.
1 Further, Diamond [10] showed the latter case is implied by some weak form of efficiency. Cass and Yaari's connection between positive net assets and (their notion of) Pareto efficiency is not applicable here, in particular, due to their reliance on logarithmic utility, non-Cobb-Douglas production, no transfers and constant life-time productivity. 2 We show that Gale's insight is still true for "stationary" equilibria in the present setup: in a golden rule equilibrium (gre) net savings almost always differ from the value of accumulated capital, while in any other balanced growth equilibrium (bge) the two are equal; see section 6 for this dichotomy.
Not all classical results extend though: for instance, the number pure bge (with zero net assets) is not necessarily odd, as was found in [15] . In particular, without any transfers, the number of pure bge is even if the minimal working age exceeds the intertemporal elasticity parameter (by cor. 18). This is then in accord with the non-existence of pure bge claimed in [7] for a similar economy without production.
While pure (lump-sum) transfers across contemporary consumers do not change gre (cor. 15), their presence can affect even the parity of pure bge (cor. 18). Positive aggregate transfer can lead to nonsensical (overinvestment) equilibria where aggregate consumption is strictly less than the aggregate endowment (see sect. 5.1).
In addition, under a mild restriction on technology, we find that there are no 'trivial' equilibria where capital is identically zero (see comm. 20). Ruling out equilibria where capital is sometimes zero, is far from trivial in this model (see cor. 12), although to the best of our knowledge in the previous literature such equilibria were ruled out by assumption (often made implicitly).
Absence of financial bubbles (i.e., "overpriced" capital stock) often taking the form of a transversality-like condition follows in the present set-up from profit maximisation of finitely-lived investment and production firms, see comment 19 .
Finally (at least in case of Cobb-Douglas production), indeterminacy (as in [16] ) disappears in this model, as is shown in [19] , which was one of the basic reasons to use for time -as also partially confirmed since then in [9] . As to the model itself, it includes the following new features: Individual productivity is an arbitrary positive function of age. Among others, it crucially affects the parity of bge.
The distinction between production firms, transforming capital and labour instantaneously into 'output', merchandising firms, transforming output into either consumption or investment, and finitely-lived investment firms, whose technology is the capital accumulation equation: they buy the investment good from the merchandising firms and rent capital out to the production firms. Of course, any other setup (including, e.g., consumers being themselves the investment firms, as in [10] ) with the same aggregate production possibilities is equivalent, and leads to the same equilibria. But the present distinction allows to focus on the main geometric aspects of the aggregate production set (of production and merchandising firms), and in particular to think properly about the irreversibility aspects for each type of transformations. If investment is a.e. strictly positive and strictly less than output (so the irreversibility constraints are not hit), we can speak of "interior equilibria"; those are independent of the irreversibility constraints, and there output, investment and consumption behave as a single good, with a single price, which is then also the price of capital.
Allowing individual consumption and prices (more generally, flows and their prices) to be any non-negative extended-real valued Lebesgue-measurable functions of time (or equivalence classes of such functions). With such definitions, equilibria are fully determined by the usual maximisation and market-clearing conditions only, without imposing them to lie in addition in some predetermined spaces. Since indirect utility can be infinite even if prices are positive and finite over the life-time, we use only very basic optimisation techniques to characterise individual demand (sect. 3.2). We extend accordingly (sect. 3.6, app. A) the classical approach [1, 8] to derive the demand correspondence.
Sect. 2 contains the model, sect. 4 the equilibrium equations (with preparations in sect. 3), sect. 5 characterisation of bge, and several examples (the nonsensical bge and all bge of Cobb-Douglas economies without transfers); sect. 6 Gale's dichotomy, and finiteness and parity results for bge are in sect. 7. Conclusions follow. Labour. An individual can rent his time endowment (1 at each instant, =100%) partly out as labour; its efficiency varies with age s according to a non-null integrable function ζ s ≥ 0. Further, labour productivity grows with time at rate γ, as is classical in exogenous growth. So, total productive labour available at t equals: His time sells for´1 0 w x+s ζ s ds, where x is his birth-date and w t is the (per unitefficiency) wage rate at time t, an -valued Lebesgue measurable function of time.
2.1.3. Endowments. His initial endowment of consumption goods is ω x,s at age s. ω is locally integrable.
3 Its sign is not restricted, in order to represent a.o. arbitrary transfer policies. Similarly,ĉ x,s denotes a point in his consumption set.
Denote the price of consumption goods by p C , an + -valued Lebesgue-measurable function of time. The cost of any consumption bundle c,´1 0 p C x+s c(s)ds, is then welldefined. 4 Shares in profits are null (constant returns to scale production), so the individual's lifetime wealth is the value of his endowment (of consumption goods and of leisure), M x def =´1 0 (p C x+s ω x,s + w x+s ζ s )ds, provided that integral is well-defined. 5 2.1.4. Consumer optimisation. Allowing agents to buy commodities outside their lifetime will not change the the aggregates in the equilibria characterised here. 6 By 2.1.3, the budget set (paths of consumption and leisure) is now well-defined whenever M x is, and hence so is utility-maximisation over the budget set. Thus, the criterion for consumer optimisation is that almost all agents with well-defined M x maximise their utility over their budget set.
In the equilibria we will characterise, M x will be well-defined a.e.
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Comment 1. One might argue whether the above definition is correct in case where both prices and wealth are infinite; but infinite prices will not occur in any equilibrium, for other reasons, 5 so we might as well have left individual demand to be the whole positive orthant in that case, without affecting the results; the above was chosen just for greater simplicity in the phrasing. Similarly, lemma 4 below will show that, with a.e. finite prices, the maximal utility is always achieved; so the above requirement of exact maximisation implies no further hidden restrictions: the definition of equilibrium is the same as if consumer optimisation applied only when further the consumer does have a maximal element in his budget set. 
The production set is any closed convex cone with free-disposal, containing the graph of the production function and the activities of transforming output into consumption and investment, and contained in the closed convex cone spanned by the production function, free-disposal, and 2-way transformations of output into consumption and investment. This allows thus for any possible form of 'irreversibility'.
8
Manufacturing produces undifferentiated output Y t , using the above technology, from labour L t , bought from individuals at price w t , and capital K t , rented from investment firms at rate r t .
Merchandising transforms Y t (with price p Y t ) one-to-one into either the consumption good C t or the investment good I t . This transformation may or may not be partially reversible depending on the instantaneous production set. C t is sold at price p C t to individuals and I t at price p I t to investment firms. Comment 2. This distinction is just to give a convenient informal language; one can't distinguish 2 types of firm: it is not true that any instantaneous production cone as above decomposes into the sum of 2 closed convex cones, one in (Y, L, K)-space corresponding to manufacturing and one in (C, I, Y )-space for merchandising.
Note that if p Y t = ∞, profits of any production plan with positive output are either infinite or, if also w t or r t are ∞, undefined. This is incompatible with any equilibrium concept, so we exclude it formally:
2.2. Capital K t accumulates as K t = I t − δK t ; to make this precise, one would need to spell out the exact differential equation theory used and the exact properties required of the functions K t and I t . To this effect we reinterpret this in integral form;
9 formally: K t = e −δ(t−t0) K t0 +´t t0 e −δ(t−s) I s ds as a wide Denjoy integral.
10
Cor. 2 will show that the above integral is in fact a plain Lebesgue integral.
11,12
As any differential equation, the capital accumulation equation needs an initial condition, which is part of the description of what is feasible, of the technology:
x .
8 Y being a purely intermediate good could as well be netted out. One gets then a closed convex cone in 4 , contained in {C + I ≤ F (K, L)} and containing {max(C, I, C + I) ≤ F (K, L)}. 9 The integral form yields the possibility to use arbitrary integrable It rather than exact derivatives, which is crucial e.g. in [19] . Its interpretation is as direct as that of the differential equation: Kt is what remains after depreciation from Kt 0 and the intervening investments. 10 For the right interpretation of the capital-accumulation equation, one needs, as argued in [21] , to use Denjoy rather than Lebesgue integration, in order to include the classical solutions of this differential equation -and then one may as well use the most encompassing integration theory: the integral above is meant as a wide Denjoy integral [e.g., 5, p. 27].
11 Its proof does not use any specific properties of the wide Denjoy integral: it applies to any monotone linear extension of the Lebesgue integral to some vector space of Lebesgue-measurable functions for which primitives are locally bounded (or even just: in L loc 1 ). 12 And thus the corresponding differential equation theory can be taken as Caratheodory's. 13 Cf. app. B.3 for a more formal treatment of the aggregate production set, in this respect too.
The word "exponentially" can be dropped here 14 iff´∞ 1 Comment 6. Ass. 3 seems out of place: normally one defines production sets Z f for each firm f , and the aggregate production set Z is just the integral of the correspondence f → Z f -i.e., the allowed production plans are the integrable selections of this correspondence. And, e.g., part 3.d does not look at all like an integrability requirement. We show nevertheless in app. B.3 that such a standard approach is possible, and that ass. 3 is then an implication, and further that the whole paper is consistent as well with this more standard approach (a.o., no implied aggregate restrictions).
Investment profits.
The evaluation of profits of the investment firms is discussed in app. B.4, B.6 (and B.1 for motivation). In particular, as mentioned in the introduction, we refuse to impose additional restrictions on endogenous variables like prices, that would stem from assuming them to belong to some 'spaces', instead of proving that equilibrium forces them to be there. In particular, prices of flows (C t , I t ) are naturally thought as non-negative -valued Lebesgue-measurable functions of time, but for the price of a stock, like capital, even Lebesgue-measurability has no reason to be there. Thus the possible prices a priori cannot belong to the space of continuous linear functionals on the topological vector space containing the production sets, and we will have to resort to integration theory to define profits. There will even be some combinations of a price system and a feasible production bundle for which profits cannot be defined; so we will just assume that, whenever profits are well-defined, they are non-positive, and prove that, in the final characterisation thus obtained, profits are well-defined and ≤ 0 over all production sets Z f .
Equivalence Classes.
Observe that for any individual consumption bundle c any equivalent function (coinciding with c a.e.) has the same utility and the same budget, so we will think of it as an equivalence class of + -valued measurable functions. The same applies to all flows, Y t , I t , C t , labour-and capital-services, and to their prices p Y , p I , p C , w, and r. On the other hand capital is a stock, so it and its price p t are defined pointwise, and no measurability restriction has a reason to apply.
2.4.
Variants. The general model above allows for irreversibility, and, with it, is a particular case of the model described in [21] . So it is this that we need to provide in [17] the "proof of non-vacuity" for [21] .
The-classic-variant is where consumption and investment are freely transformable into each other, thus effectively defining a 1 good model; we will refer to this as the basic model, which will be used to establish results for the general model.
Intensive variables.
Let E denote the economy described above. 
2.5.3. The reduced economy. Define now a new economy E as the original one E with the following parameters:
2.5.4.
Isomorphism of E and E . First we give a general definition of isomorphism of economies, 19 in case of constant returns to scale production, so profit shares can be ignored. The general case is sketched in fn. 20. Definition 2. Take two economies E i (i ∈ {1, 2}) with the corresponding measure spaces of agents (denoted by (A i , A i , α i )) and firms, production and consumption sets, and preferences. An isomorphism between E 1 and E 2 is any composition of the following 3 elementary isomorphisms and/or their inverses:
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(a) Rescaling agents: the map is the identity, except that α 1 and α 2 are mutually absolutely continuous, s.t. if h = dα1 dα2 , then ω 2 (a) = h(a)ω 1 (a) and a prefers x to y in E 1 iff he prefers h(a)x to h(a)y in E 2 . (b) Mapping agents: a measurable map of agents g : A 1 → A 2 which is measurepreserving: for any coalition A ∈ A 2 , α 2 (A) = α 1 (g −1 (A)). Further, ∀a ∈ A 2 , all agents in g −1 (a) have the same preferences and endowments.
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(c) Commodity map: a linear map of commodity spaces, mapping production sets, consumption sets, endowments and preferences of E 1 onto those of E 2 .
Remark 7. When consumption sets are the positive orthant, a map as sub c reduces to a bijection between names of commodities in both economies together with a rescaling of each commodity (change of units).
Lemma 1. E and E are isomorphic, using the following sequence of elementary isomorphisms: (a) Map all agents born at x to a single agent born at x. (b) Rescale the mass N 0 e νx dx of agents born in [x, x + dx] to dx. (c) Map productive labour and commodities dated t (I t , C t , K t . . .) to themselves, dividing quantities by L t .
Proof. The map is by definition an isomorphism, all agents born at x being identical; so one has to show that its image is E . The population measure is indeed Lebesgue measure, by definition. Consumption sets remain the same, being the positive orthant, so unaffected by rescalings. Similarly, the instantaneous production set remains the same, being a cone, so unaffected under rescaling by the constant L t .
A commodity bundleĉ x for an agent born at x becomes N 0 e νxĉ x by the rescaling, then, by the commodity map,ĉ x,s = N 0 e νxĉ x,s /L x+s which is c x+s,s , and ω x,s becomes E x+s,s . By the homogeneity of degree 1 − e −βs u(ĉ x.s )ds by the formula for η, so utilities are preserved up to a multiplicative constant.
As to labour, an input of l x,s units of time in E becomes N 0 e νx l x,s units of time after rescaling mass, i.e., N 0 e νx e γ(x+s) l x,s ζ s productive labour, so, after the commodity map (division by L t ), e −νs l x,s ζ s /´1 0 e −νu du = l x,s ϕ s , which is indeed the productive labour corresponding to l x,s in E , by our above formula.
Remains the technology of investment firms. For the capital accumulation equation, this is obvious (especially in the formal general form of sect. 2.2.2, e δt K t − e δt0 K t0 =´t t0 e δs I s ds), and for the initial condition (in both forms) as well. 20 In general (absence of constant returns to scale), one needs also the following (we continue to assume the standard convexity assumptions, and assume that profit shares are described by a transition probability π from the measure space of firms to that of agents such that π(A|f ) is negligible for every null set A): (1) For mapping agents (b), require further that, ∀B ∈ A 1 , ∀S ∈ F,´S π 1 (B|f )µ(df ) =´P(B|g −1 (A 2 ))´S π 2 (da 2 |f )µ(df ) (collapsed agents have the same profit shares). (2) A rescaling as sub (a) for the firms. (3) As for (b), collapsing firms with identical production sets into a single firm, in a mass-preserving way, and with as profit shares the average of the original profit shares. (4) Collapsing firms with identical profit distributions into a single firm, with as production set the integral of those of the constituent firms.
A.o., the above suffice to make any economy isomorphic to the corresponding private production economy (which is, for our model, a classical interpretation for the investment sector). One might then of course want to add Rader's trick, to reduce those to pure exchange economies with 0 endowments, and then possibly, to get rid of irrelevant parts of the consumption sets, that 2 agents in such a pure exchange economy with identical excess demand functions can be identified. 21 One could allow for different endowments in case of homogeneous preferences.
2.5.5.
Variables for E . The variables K t , Y t , I t , C t ,ĉ x,s for E are thus k t , y t , i t , c t , c x+s,s ; and, since L t = 1 in E , the "further variables" for E are the same.
Characterisation of Equilibria
Notation 3.1. λ denotes Lebesgue measure on . Φ(x) = e x −1
x . For h : → , h ∞,1 = sup x´x x−1 |h(t)|dt, and E ∞,1 = sup x´x x−1´| E t,s |dsdt. R = γ + ν + δ.
f ∞ < R, 22 and ∃x : f (x) > Rx ; i.e., F (1, 0) < R < F (1, ∞).
3.1. Some bounds stemming from feasibility.
Lemma 2. For a concave continuous function φ : + → , with φ(0) ≥ 0, φ ∞ ∈ , and sup x φ(x) > 0, letκ def = sup{x | φ(x) ≥ 0}. The solutions (Caratheodory or classical) of the differential equation k t = φ(k t ) are of one of the following 4 types: (a) k t for t ∈ is strictly convex and decreases from ∞ toκ, (b) k t = x ∀t, for x ∈ {0,κ} ∩ , (c) If φ(0) > 0, k has domain [T, ∞[ with k T = 0 and increases strictly toκ, (d) If φ(0) = 0, k t has domain , and is 0 until some T , then increases strictly from 0 toκ. T is finite iff 1/φ is locally integrable at 0, else T = −∞.
Further, in the non-constant parts of solutions, k is the inverse of a primitive of 1 φ ; and within each type the solutions differ only by a time-shift. Comment 8. In particular, uniqueness fails iff φ(0) = 0 and 1/φ is locally integrable at 0, with 0 as initial value (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas case).
Proof. φ is locally Lipschitz except possibly at 0, so the standard uniqueness theorem applies there. In particular, ifκ ∈ , k t =κ is such a unique solution, so any other solution lies everywhere either above it or below. The former are clearly decreasing and strictly convex [since k t = φ (k t )φ(k t )]; and since φ(x) ≥ xφ ∞ , they cannot blow up to +∞ before t gets to −∞: they are defined on , and decrease from +∞ toκ. It is then easily seen that their convergence to +∞ at −∞ and tō κ at +∞ is exponential. The others are strictly increasing when > 0, from 0 toκ, converging again toκ at +∞, exponentially if φ ∞ = 0. Remains thus to check the case k t = 0.
If φ(0) > 0, k t ≡ 0 is not a solution, so let k t1 > 0. Since k t <κ ∀t and is increasing, its slope before t 1 is bounded away from 0, so any solution hits 0 at a finite time t 0 . And clearly there is no continuation (even Caratheodory) for t < t 0 : solutions are defined on [t 0 , ∞[, starting with the value 0 and a positive derivative.
If φ(0) = 0, k t ≡ 0 is a solution. And since any solution k t is increasing and unique as soon as positive, ∃t 0 ∈ : k t = 0 iff t ≤ t 0 . Then, for t > t 0 , the differential equation is equivalent to dk φ(k) = dt. Assume t 0 < ∞, and fix
As seen above, k t remains after t 0 in { k | φ(k) > 0 }, and there h(x) is well defined, strictly increasing and continuous, and
0) and thus t 0 is finite iff 1 φ is locally integrable at 0, and then, as t t 0 , k t 0 and so k t = φ(k t ) 0: letting k t = 0 ∀t ≤ t 0 defines the solution on , and it is C 1 even at t 0 . In the other case also, the solutions are defined on , but then either strictly increasing or identically 0. 
Proof. If k t > 0 ∀t > t 0 , then, by lemma 2, 1 φ(·) is locally integrable at 0, and with Proof. a: Let ψ(x) = f (x) − Rx, φ = ψ + P with P = Ω ∞,1 , and κ P be the positive root of φ(x) = 0. By concavity of f and ass. 4, ∃a, b > 0 :
. Suffices thus to prove that for any feasible path k t ,
indeed, even if all aggregate transfers Ω t for t ∈ [−1, 0] are pushed to time 0, then k 0− > κ P , ≥ κ 0 , and thus k t must be decreasing on [−1, 0[, since even if all agents work full-time and consume nothing it decreases by lemma 2. Thus k t > κ P in this case. And if part of the transfers occur earlier in [−1, 0[, the conclusion holds a fortiori, since we are in a region where (additions to) capital cannot be maintained.
Any time-shift of the feasible allocation is still feasible. Do thus a convolution (an average of time-shifts) of Ω t , i t and k t with a uniform distribution on [0, 1]: the new Ω t , i t and k t are still feasible, by linearity, and concavity of f , and now Ω ∞ ≤ P and k 0 > κ P . We can then further increase Ω s.t. Ω t = P everywhere.
Let (for t ≤ 0) κ t be the minimal amount of capital needed to reach k 0 at time 0: it is when agents work full-time and consume nothing, so it is (uniquely, cf. lemma 2) given by the differential equation κ t = φ(κ t ): κ t is a lower bound for k t , hence satisfies a fortiori ass. 1: ∃ε > 0 : a t κ t −−−→ t→−∞ 0 with a = e −φ ∞ −ε > 1. And φ(κ 0 ) < 0. Thus, by lemma 2, κ t → ∞, hence
, contradicting a t κ t −−−→ t→−∞ 0. For the second form of ass. 1, we paraphrase the end of the proof in [21, App. C, prop. 4]. κ t = φ(κ t ) yields, with h(x) =´x κ dy φ(y) , whereκ = κ P + 1, h(κ t ) = t − a for some a ∈ (since κ t > κ P ∀t). By ass. 1, e −φ ∞ t κ t −−−→ t→−∞ 0. Thus, with x = κ t and
is of the order −z 2 for z ≥κ, we get that
Replacing now φ by ψ makes a difference of P z 2 in the integrand, which is integrable; then the integrand is the same with f instead of ψ, contradicting thus the 'Strong No-Rabbit' condition in the second form of ass. 1.
This argument also proves the 'only if' part in the second item of ass. 1. [21] , plus app. C (ibidem) to deal with the weak initial condition, cannot be used here, since those proofs crucially rely on irreversibility, which does not hold in the "basic model", where current proof applies, while relying on the 1 capital good aspect. derivative k t . At any point where k is differentiable the left hand side in our above formula has as derivative e Rt (Rk t + k t ), so this must equal a.e. the integrand in the right hand side: i t = Rk t + k t a.e. Thus (k being a primitive of its derivative) 
+ u(e γx v x ) for any feasible plan.
3.2. Individual demand. Since utilities can be ±∞, marginal utility of income is not necessarily defined, so classical techniques (e.g., Lagrange theorem) do not apply, and we have to apply Lagrange-type techniques from scratch. Such utilities can be consistent with prices, income and consumption being positive and finite everywhere, as shown in lemma 4, so they have a-priori nothing pathological. For example, for σ < 1 the utility can be −∞ for a consumer whose life-time includes a region (of time) when price of the consumption good is "too high" (but can be finite throughout), more precisely, when p 1−σ is not locally integrable, so his lifetime utility equals −∞ for any consumption with finite life-time budget. Since the demand can be multivalued (e.g., any point in the budget set can be optimal), clearly, it can not always be written as a "dynamic system" (or a differential equation) for an arbitrary price-income combination.
Next Fenchel-duality result is elementary; it will be used, in particular, to derive individual demand in lemma 4.
where the left hand member is defined by continuity in z at ∞.
σ is the unique maximiser.
Lemma 4. For any budget M ∈ + and price-system (a) Indirect utility (maximal -on the budget set) equals U * and is achieved. (b) U * ∈ iff J < ∞. (c) Demand is unique (as an equivalence class) iff either U * ∈ or (σ < 1 and) z s = ∞ a.e. Also, demand is unique (= 0) at all s such that z s = ∞. (d) Whenever demand is unique, c * s is well-defined a.e., and demand is given by the equivalence class of c * s .
Proof. Point (b) is obvious.
If M = 0 and p t > 0 a.e., the result is obvious: c t = 0 on the budget set, so c * = 0, and if σ > 1, then U * = 0, while if σ < 1, then U * = −∞. When M = 0, σ > 1, and λ{p t = 0} > 0, many feasible bundles achieve U * = ∞, so demand is not unique, hence the lemma is established in this case.
When M = 0, σ < 1, and 0 < λ{p t = 0} < 1, the agent's instantaneous optimal consumption is clearly c t = ∞ when p t = 0, c t = 0 otherwise; but since λ{p t = 0} > 0 this gives him utility −∞, so any point in his budget set is optimal, and the lemma is established in this case too. And if p t = 0 a.e., c t = ∞ a.e., so z t = 0 a.e., U * = 0, and this case is covered too. Thus the lemma is established when M = 0. So, henceforth M > 0. Assume now M < ∞. To calculate the indirect utility, consider, after Lagrange,
dt, and the equivalence class ofc t = (
pt ) σ is a maximiser, unique iff the maximum of L is finite, i.e., iff J < ∞ clearly.
For J < ∞, the budget
dt is finite. In particular, if 0 < J < ∞, by varying µ we can obtain M 1 = M for any 0 < M < ∞; so for any such M , and the corresponding µ(M ), we obtainc(µ(M )) = c * and U (c * ) = U * as in the statement. And c * is the agent's unique optimal choice given his budget M : for any c = c *
where the strict inequality is by the uniqueness property of the maximiserc. So p, c ≤ M and c = c * implies U (c ) < U * . Thus the statement is proved for 0 < J < ∞ and M < ∞. When 0 < M < ∞, J = 0 means, since p t < ∞ a.e., that σ < 1, p t = 0 = z t a.e., so c = ∞ = c * , and the utility U * = 0 is attained, thus this case is settled too. To summarize, the lemma is proved when M < ∞ and either M = 0 or J < ∞. If J = ∞ (and, recall, 0 < M < ∞), then, for σ < 1, L(c) = −∞ ∀c. So, whenever p t c t is integrable, the indirect utility is´1 0 µe −βt u(c t )dt = −∞, hence all points in the budget set are utility maximisers. Thus this case is solved too.
So, in case 0 < M < ∞ it remains to prove the lemma for J = ∞ and σ > 1, which then is assumed to hold for the next two paragraphs.
Consider the indirect utility function V (M ) (for fixed price system p): by homogeneity, it must be of the form vu(M ) for some v ≥ 0. Assume now v < ∞. Then by lemma 3 for any ) are non-negative and increase to that forc t (µ): by the monotone convergence theorem,c t (µ) still satisfies the same inequality, i.e., as seen above,
We claim that therefore, ∀M : 0 < M < ∞, there exist (many) c in the budget set with U (c) = ∞. Indeed, note first that there exists a partition of [0, 1] in 2 Borel subsets of equal Lebesgue measure such that J = ∞ on each (e.g., consider the distribution of the integrand of J, and on each atom use non-atomicity of Lebesgue measure). Next re-use this on one of the subsets, etc., to obtain a Borel partition into a sequence B n with λ(B n ) = 2 −n s.t. J = ∞ on each B n . Hence for each B n the supremum of utility derived on that subset of time with a strictly positive finite budget should be infinite by the argument above. Choose thus for each n a consumption planĉ n on B n costing ≤ 2 −n M and with´B
the resulting total consumption planĉ costs ≤ M and has infinite utility (and so does θĉ for 0 < θ < 1): U * = +∞ is attained and demand is multivalued. Remains thus only the case M = ∞. Then, since p < ∞ a.e., for σ > 1, U * = ∞ and demand is multivalued. While for σ < 1, U * = 0 and c * = ∞.
3.3. Optimality of production.
Wherever the constraint that consumption cannot be transformed into output is not binding p
e. Wherever the constraint that investment cannot be transformed into output is not binding, p
2 c is positively homogeneous of degree one, concave and continuous on 
24
Assume p Y t < ∞. Then maximal profit of the production firms at time t is 0 iff w t , r t ≥ 0, and c(r
The zero profit condition in merchandising implies that p Thus, using r, w, p for r t , e −γt w t , p
(resp., (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0)) this yields p ≥ 0 (resp., r ≥ 0 and w ≥ 0), and then remains to express the condition when Y = F (K, L) > 0: homogeneity of F of degree 1 yields then the result.
We now reformulate the condition of lemma 5.c; we will need both formulations.
Assume the price of output, p, is finite. Then maximal profits of the production firm are 0 iff p ≥ 0, g ∞ ≤ 0 and sup k≥0 g(k) ≤ w.
Proof. p ≥ 0 is by lemma 5.c. Next, profits are non-negative if for all feasible (Y, K, L), pY − wL − rK ≤ 0. Not using free-disposal, i.e., setting Y = F (K, L) can only increase profits, hence it is sufficient to verify that pF (K, L)−wL−rK ≤ 0. If L = 0, this inequality is equivalent to pF (K, 0) − rK ≤ 0, which holds trivially
and r ≥ 0, this is equivalent to w ≥ g(k) ∀k (treat separately the case where r = ∞, and similarly for w), hence w ≥ sup k≥0 g(k).
The case L > 0 yields by homogeneity that g(k) < w ∀k > 0, and 24 In fact, the unit-cost function c is continuous wherever finite. Also, its definition implies that c(r,w) ≤ c(´r,´w) for any [0, ∞]-valued measurable functionsr andw ("strong concavity").
A.e. on D, M x ≥ 0 and U * x of lemma 4 is well-defined and is the equilibrium utility. Proof. D is Lebesgue measurable by the joint measurability of ω, and the same implies M x is Lebesgue measurable there. M x ≥ 0 a.e. there is an obvious equilibrium condition. That U * x is well-defined on D and is the equilibrium utility follows then from lemma 4.a because p C t < ∞ by lemma 5.a and def. 1. 
and thus 
As to d, lower semi-continuity of H # is clear, since it is the limit of the increasing sequence of continuous functions´x
e. And else, we just saw that a.e. on D, p
and e implies the same for σ > 1. Thus x = y ∈ D 1 implies |x − y| > 1: D 1 is closed and discrete. Thus also c.
Optimal investment.
Lemma 7. Investment firms maximise profits at a feasible point iff p I t = p t < ∞ a.e., and ς(t) def = e −δt p t −´∞ t r s e −δs ds ≥ 0 is decreasing, and constant where K t > 0.
Comment 10. Observe the condition depends only on aggregates. Indeed, prop. 2 and 3 in app. B.3 imply that there always exists a disaggregation, satisfying the strictest conditions, and for which the two notions of profits are equivalent (lemma 23): the one of app B.4 used for necessity, requiring bounded variation of the firm's capital and the more general one (in app. B.6), used for sufficiency.
Proof. We first prove the conditions are necessary. To show p t < ∞ ∀t, assume else p t0 = ∞. But then investment firms alive just before t 0 can make infinite profits. Indeed, consider (ass.
So if those firms invest at unit rate during this set they get a positive amount of capital at finite cost, that can be re-sold for ∞ at t 0 ; contradiction.
Next, r t is locally integrable: if it was not integrable on
, and let those firms buy some capital at t 0 − ε, cash its returns until t 0 , and sell it then, yielding infinite profit, since p t < ∞. Similarly with G t0+ if r t is not integrable on
Consider a deviation (as in lemma 22 of app. B.2) where firms f s.t. K 
, with g(t) = e −δt p t +´t 0 r s e −δs ds, < ∞ since r s is locally integrable and p t < ∞. Fix now t, and assume either K t > 0 or ξ > 0. If ξ ≥ 0, the above deviation is always feasible. Else, by assumption 3.d, ∃ε > 0 :
with µ(G) > 0; and then the deviation is feasible ∀f ∈ G, ∀ξ :
, thus, t being arbitrary, g is decreasing, and is constant wherever K t > 0.
So ∀t ≥ 0 g(0) ≥´t 0 r s e −δs ds, and g(0) < ∞, hence´∞ 0 r s e −δs ds < ∞; subtracting this quantity from g(t) we get that ς(t) = e −δt p t −´∞ t r s e −δs ds is decreasing and (letting t → ∞) ≥ 0, and is constant wherever K t > 0.
Next we show that p I t = p t a.e. Else, p being Borel by the previous conclusion, there exists, by Lusin's theorem, a compact set K with λ(K) > 0 to which p I t and p t have a continuous restriction, with either (1) p t > p
G n is the set of firms alive on L n ; µ(G n ) > 0 for n ≥ n 0 by ass. 2.c. Let firms buy/sell additional investment δI
, and, at time T , sell the additional accumulated capital, resp., buy additional capital such that it will be exactly offset by δI n . So δK n t = e −δt Ln (t)´t T ±n −1 e δs δI n s ds. Observe that δK n t is of bounded variation and ≥ 0, and jointly measurable (in (f, t)) by the same property of δI n t . By the formula sub claim 10 in app. B.2, the induced variation in profit is:
The last term in the integrand is jointly integrable in (t, f ), by the same property of δI n t and the continuity of p I on the compact set K, δI n t being 0 outside of K. And the first term, r t δK n t , is the integral over s of ξr t e −δt J(s, t)e δs δI n s , with J(s, t) = T −n −1 ≤s≤t≤T in case 1 and T ≤t≤s≤T +n −1 in case 2, and where all terms are clearly jointly measurable and have a constant sign. Linearity of the integral allows then to integrate both terms separately (the second being integrable); Fubini's theorem allows then, for the first term, to integrate first over t, yielding for this term´L n e δs δI n s
´T s e −δt r t dt ds. Replacing also δK n T by its value, we get thus, re-using linearity of the integral, δπ n =´L n p T e δ(t−T ) + e δt´T t e −δs r s ds − p
δtn´T tn e −δs r s ds − p I tn ≤ 0. Since K n shrinks to {T }, t n → T , so, by continuity of p I and p on K, we get in the limit ξ(p T − p I T ) ≤ 0, contradiction. Remains to show that with such prices, investment firms make zero profits, and can't do better. We allow here for any production plans satisfying def. 11 in app. B.6. Accordingly the corresponding profits are π =´(r t − p t δ)K t dt + ffl K t dp t +´(p t − p I t )I t dt. Since p I = p a.e., the last term is zero. And the formula for p t implies dp t = (p t δ − r t )dt + e δt dς t , so π = ffl e δt K t dς t . Since ς is decreasing and K t ≥ 0, indeed π ≤ 0 for any plan in the production set.
If however K f t is feasible, as an aggregate production plan, so
a.e. Let then Z = {t | K t = 0}: ∀t ∈ Z, K f t = 0 a.e., and, by continuity of K t and Fatou's lemma, also, at discontinuities of p t , K f t− = K f t+ = 0 a.e. and the convergence is in L 1 , so all assumptions of lemma 25 are satisfied-p I t I f t is integrable since p I t = p t is locally bounded, and for r t K f t : since the integrand is ≥ 0, first integrate over f (Fubini), then use that K t is locally bounded and r t locally integrable. Since dς t is carried by Z, clearly the aggregate π = 0, so by lemma 25 π f = 0 µ-a.e.
Comment 11. As the "hot potato" example (app. B.1) shows, ass. 3.d is clearly needed to derive the lemma. Without it, one cannot deduce the constancy of ς t , even where K t > 0 (though one can obtain that there ς(t) is the sum of countably many jumps, i.e., its continuous part is 0, getting then similarly in thm. 1 the analog of thm. 1(3) for such ς t ). So the example presents really the pure form of the difficulty.
Corollary 7. p Y = p implies p is locally bounded away from zero.
Proof. If, on the contrary, p is not locally bounded away from zero, then, by lemma 7, there exists a finite t 0 such that lim t t0 p t = 0 and p t = 0 for t > t 0 . But this is impossible since p Y ≥ p C a.e. by lemma 5.a and p C is distinct from zero on a non-negligible set, by lemma 6.c.
First conclusions about equilibria.
Lemma 8. Assume D is negligible and either σ > 1 or (p C ) 1−σ is locally integrable. Then, for a.e. agent, any addition to income increases his life-time utility.
is the indirect utility of consumer born at x with income M by lemma 4.a. The integral is > 0 a.e. (cor. 6.d), and finite for σ < 1, (p C ) 1−σ being locally integrable, so V x is well-defined even on [0, ∞] and is strictly increasing in M . For σ > 1, assume first it is finite. Then V x is strictly increasing in M as above. While if the integral is infinite, cor. 6.a implies that H < ∞ a.e., so M x = 0. Since p C t > 0 a.e. (cor. 6.e), this implies in lemma 4 that z t = ∞ a.e., so J x = 0 and hence the equilibrium utility U * x (cor. 5) is well-defined and = 0. On the other hand for M > 0, the integral being infinite implies that V x (M ) is so too. Thus in this case too any increase in budget increases utility -from 0 to +∞. Finally, since M x < ∞ a.e. (cor. 6.b), any addition to M x increases the budget, and hence the utility.
Corollary 8. Assume D is negligible and either σ > 1 or (p C ) 1−σ is locally integrable. Then a.e. w t > 0 implies full employment (labour contracted =L t ).
Proof. Assume contrary to the statement that the set
X is a set of consumers who can increase their income by supplying labour and hence by lemma 8 can improve their utility. Since´h x dx = λ(P )λ(T ) > 0, X is non-negligible, contradiction.
Lemma 9.
(a) C t is locally integrable, and p t is locally bounded. (b) D is negligible if either p C is locally bounded or ω ≥ 0. (c) Assume D negligible. Then p t is locally bounded away from 0 unless f is bounded, σ < 1, and either (p
When it is known that p Y = p I , cor. 7 is easier to use to establish that p t is locally bounded away from 0, but point (c) will be used in lemma 12.
Proof
Thus ∃k, 0 <k < ∞: f k = fk iff k ≥k and, a.e. on T , e −γt w t /p Y t = fk. So w t > 0 a.e. on T . Cor. 8 implies contracted labour = L t where w t > 0. Thus, a.e. on T , k t <k would yield negative profits in production, so a.e. on T , k t ≥k, i.e., f (k t ) = 0.
We claim finally that σ < 1. Indeed, else, by cor. 6.e p
, no output nor consumption good can be transformed into investment there: I t = 0 there, hence k t = k t0 e −R(t−t0) will at some time get below k, contradiction. , and similarly for the upper derivative D.
Remark 13. In the following, we also select w.l.o.g. canonical representatives within equivalence classes, so as to make maximisation hold everywhere instead of just a.e.
Lemma 10. Assume p Y = p I , and let g t = f (k t ). Then, ∀t:
(a) (1) 0 ≤ p C ≤ p, p is locally bounded and locally bounded away from 0.
γt p t , with kf k defined as 0 at 0, by continuity.
−πt+´t 0 (δ−gs)ds , with π t locally constant on k t > 0 and monotone.
x+s ω x,s + w x+s ζ s ]ds ≥ 0 a.e., and is locally integrable. (b) a2-a4, with 0 < p t < ∞ (from a1), imply that all firms maximise profits. (c) Given 0 < p t < ∞, a5 is equivalent to the existence of r t s.t. a4 holds. (d) Further, if f (0) = ∞ and f (0) = 0, and if either Ω t ≤ 0 ∀t (e.g., pure transfers), or if consumption cannot be reverted to output (i.e., (
Remark 14. Note that, since g ≥ 0, a5 implies that both π t and´t 0 g s ds are everywhere real-valued. Indeed, both are increasing, and whenever one is finite the other must be too, since p t ∈ ++ ; thus, since the integral is finite at 0, π 0 is also finite, hence for t > 0 they must be both finite (since else both +∞ contradicts p t ∈ ++ ), and similarly if t < 0. Thus π t is -valued and g in L loc
1 . Remark 15. Also, a2 implies full output utilisation, and, iff either
Proof. a1: p t is locally bounded away from zero by cor. 7, and locally bounded by lemma 7. By lemma 5.a, 0 ≤ p C t ≤ p t ∀t. Hence p C is locally bounded and by lemma 9.b M x is well-defined a.e. Thus cor. 8 is applicable.
−γt w t . Since the equations a2-a3 hold a.e., we impose them now to hold everywhere (thereby choosing the canonical representatives, see remark 13).
This implies the following facts, used in rest of the proof. p t is continuous where K t > 0 by lemma 7, so w t is locally bounded (since f is so), and g t is continuous to + . By lemmas 7 and 5.c, r t ∈ L loc 1 + . a5: In the view of the above properties of p t and r t , the equation in lemma 7 can be differentiated term by term wherever K t > 0, since there r t = p t g t is real-valued and continuous. Doing this with z t = e −δt p t we get z t = −g t z t , where
1 , since p t g t ≤ r t a.e., r ∈ L loc 1 and p is locally bounded away from 0. Thus integrating from zero, with possibly a different constant z 0 in each interval where K t > 0, z t = z 0 e −´t 0 gsds . a5 always holds for an appropriate choice of π t , since p t > 0 and g is locally integrable; the above argument shows π t (= − ln z 0 ) is constant on each interval where k t > 0. Let H t def = π t +´t 0 g s ds: since z t = e −Ht is decreasing by lemma 7, H t is increasing, so π t = H t −´t 0 g s ds has locally bounded variation; let π a t and π s t denote its absolutely continuous and singular parts. By lemma 7, ς t def = e −Ht −´∞ t e −δs r s ds is decreasing; we first express that its absolutely continuous part is so, by expressing that ς exist a.e. and is a.e. ≤ 0. Since r s ∈ L loc 1 , the integral term in the right hand side is a.e. differentiable with finite derivative e −δt r t ; similarly, since H is increasing, e −Ht is a.e. differentiable with finite derivative −H t e −Ht ; thus r t ≤ e δt H t e −Ht a.e., = p t H t since e δt−Ht = p t , i.e., r t ≤ δp t − p t a.e. Since H t = π t + g t , we also get equivalently r t ≤ p t g t + p t π t a.e., hence, since 0 < p t < ∞, by p t g t ≤ r t a.e. (by claim 1), that π t ≥ 0 a.e. on g < ∞, hence, by g ∈ L loc 1 , π t ≥ 0 a.e.: π a is increasing. And since´t 0 g s ds is absolutely continuous, π s is the singular part of H t , which is increasing, thus so is π s . Thus a5 is proved, and p t g t ≤ r t ≤ δp t − p t a.e. By claim 1, replace r t by p t g t when k t > 0 and by max{r t , p t g t } else: this changes it only on a null set, preserving equilibrium.
b: We now prove that these inequalities, together with a2,a3 and 0 < p t < ∞, imply firms maximise profits: this along with point c will then prove point b. Clearly, a2 and a3, together with our conditions on r t , express the optimality of instantaneous production. Remains to show that a5 implies the formula of lemma 7, reversing the above argument. First, a5 implies that g t ∈ L loc 1 (cf. rem. 14). Then a5, with z t = e −δt p t = e −πt−´t 0 gsds , which is decreasing, yields ς t = z t −´∞ t e −δs r s ds, so ς t has locally bounded variation. Since r t ≤ δp t −p t a.e., ς t ≤ 0 a.e., so the absolutely continuous part of ς is decreasing. And the singular part must be that of z t , hence decreasing too. Thus ς is decreasing. Its equation above can be differentiated on intervals where k t > 0, because z t is differentiable there, π t being constant, and r t locally equals p t g t a.e., which is locally bounded and continuous. Hence there we get ς t = 0 identically (since p t = p t (δ − g t )), and thus ς t is indeed constant on each interval where K t > 0. So, by lemma 7, the investment sector maximises profits too.
We will use below the following 2 easy statements:
Claim 2. h : → is weakly increasing iff Dh ≥ 0.
Claim
Since p t > 0, our inequality yields, by claim 3,
we first conclude that h is increasing, from claim 2, and then that g ∈ L loc 1 . So we can define π t for each t by the equation in a5, since 0 < p t < ∞. Constancy of π on each interval where k t > 0 follows trivially from p t g t = δp t −p t , everything being differentiable there (Dp = Dp).
If f (0) < ∞, then g is bounded and continuous, so
If f (0) = ∞, by continuity of g, { g > δ } is a disjoint union of open intervals. On each of those, we have D t p ≤ p t (δ−g t ) < 0, so p t and hence ln p t = −π t +´t 0 (δ−g s )ds are decreasing; hence the singular part of that, which is the singular part of −π t , is also decreasing. But π is singular, since π is constant on each of the open intervals where g t < ∞: π is carried by their closed complement { g = ∞ }, which is negligible by local integrability of g. Thus π itself is increasing on any such interval. Since it is also constant on each interval where g < ∞, it is locally increasing, thus increasing. a6: The inequality follows from cor. 5. Local integrability follows from that of ω and ζ, p C and w being locally bounded. d: If K t = 0 say for t = 0, the fastest way the capital can increase afterwards is by having output equal to investment with full-employment in some interval after 0; the differential equation is then k t = φ(k t ) with φ(k) = f (k) − Rk, hence, since f (0) = 0 and f (0) = ∞, g t = φ (k t ) is not locally integrable at 0, by cor. 1, and thus similarly is so, for any smaller k t : contradiction.
Comment 16. When f (0) = ∞, condition a5 is equivalent to the classical differential equation
, under the interpretation that the equality holds everywhere, and that derivatives may have values (but must be well-defined, so p y − p x must be well-defined for y sufficiently close to x, so that p must be -valued to be differentiable). Indeed, the increasing aspect of π t ensures that the derivative is only decreased; but this happens only where K t = 0, i.e., d ln pt dt = −∞, so the equality is preserved: p t solves the differential equation. Conversely, any solution of the differential equation implies a p t as specified, using that a monotone function H on [0, 1] is a.e. differentiable and
Corollary 9. Assume p Y = p I . If f (0) = ∞, then, a.e., k t > 0 and w t > 0. 3.6. Aggregate demand. Following-up on the conventions at the start of this section, note that for aggregate consumption the classic integration of correspondences [1, 8] does not apply, as consumption bundles are equivalence classes of arbitrary + -valued Lebesgue-measurable functions, so do not lie in any vector space. The modification required is described in App. A.
The specificity and strength of next lemma is that the integral of the demandcorrespondence, instead of being an arbitrary convex set, is the set of all measurable selections from a fixed correspondence C.
Lemma 11. Assume an equilibrium with p C locally bounded, and let
The integrand is a.e. well-defined, and the integral is finite, thus continuous in t. A.e., the integrand is null iff M x is so; thus
If the right hand side is undefined, involving thus ∞ × 0, let C t = + . Then aggregate demand (the integral of individual demand) is the set of equivalence classes of all measurable selections from C t .
Proof. Neglect all negligible sets of birthdates x of cor. 6, and take as domain D the remaining part of . In particular, M x is everywhere well-defined on D and ∈ + , so lemma 4 is applicable, with M x for M and s → p C x+s for p, and demand is everywhere well-defined and non-empty, by lemma 4.a.
The demand correspondence x → Γ(x) from D to M (cf. app. A), has a measurable graph, as the intersection of the following 3 measurable graphs: . Thus, the integral of Γ is well-defined -recall we allow for correspondences to be defined only a.e., so equivalently, define, for x / ∈ D where Γ(x) is not defined (M x being not defined, or / ∈ + ), Γ(x) def = M -, and is the set of integrals over x ∈ of all jointly measurable functions c(x, t) s.t. s → c(x, x + s) ∈ Γ(x) ∀x.
Observe that requirement (a) was not part of our assumptions (cf. sect. 2.1.4), nor did we prove that in equilibrium no agent would buy any goods dated outside his life-span. But the same proof obviously shows that without this the demandcorrespondence is also measurable; we claim the integrals are the same, so our result is independent of any such assumption. Indeed, take a selection c(x, t) as above from the larger correspondence, and definec(x, t) = t−1≤x≤t c(x, t) + 1 Φ(−ν)´y / ∈[t−1,t] e ν(y−t) c(y, t)dy. Then clearlyc is measurable, has the same integral as c, and is a selection from the smaller correspondence: indeed, agents would have bought something at times t outside their life-span only if p C t = 0, since by lemma 8 (which applies since p C is locally bounded, and also by lemma 9.b, D is negligible) any increase in budget would increase their utility, so almost nobody's budget is affected by the change. Lemma 4.c and 4.d imply then that the selection c(x, t) must equal c * t−x (ibidem) when either U * x ∈ or p C t > 0 and M x = 0. Since this is a measurable region, and c * t−x is jointly measurable on this region, we can assume equality up to a (joint) null set, which does not affect the equivalence class of the integral. Further, using lemma 4.b, U * x ∈ ≡ (σ>1 ∨ M x >0) since by cor. 3 and 5 U * x < ∞ and since p C t is locally bounded. Thus equality holds whenever σ > 1 or M x > 0 or p C t > 0, i.e., since the latter holds a.e. when σ > 1 (cor. 6.e), equivalently whenever M x > 0 or p C t > 0. Note that (1) follows at all t s.t. p C t > 0, by integration. And the integrand is a.e. well-defined, since M x < ∞ a.e. (cor. 6.b) and since the denominator is a.e. > 0 by cor. 6.d. A.e., it is null iff M x = 0: if M x = 0, because the denominator is positive (cf. supra); and if M x > 0, because the denominator is finite, by local boundedness of p C if σ < 1, and by cor. 6.a if σ > 1. Thus the integral is always well-defined; so, p C being locally bounded, the right hand side is well-defined except where both the integral and p Thus we show now equality in (1) when p C t = 0 and M x is not negligible on [t−1, t]. As seen above, the right hand side is ∞ then, and, if M x > 0, c(x, t) = c * t−x , = ∞ (lemma 4, finiteness of the denominator, since M x > 0 ⇒ U * ∈ ). Hence a non-negligible set of agents has infinite demand: aggregate demand is infinite too, thus equality.
For the remaining case, where M x = 0 a.e. on [t−1, t] and p C t = 0, i.e., the "∞ × 0" case, note σ < 1 then, since else p C t > 0 a.e. (cor. 6.e). Almost all living agents have a null lifetime wealth; since they (almost) all face some non-negligible period in their lifetime where p C > 0 by cor. 6.c, U * x = −∞, so any consumption at times where p C t = 0 is both feasible and optimal for them. Since by lemma 9.a aggregate demand is locally integrable, it is a.e. finite, and thus so is the right hand side integral. Hence the integrand is locally integrable everywhere, and so the integral is everywhere finite, and is continuous in t. is integrable. 0 ≤ M x < ∞ a.e. (cor. 5 and 6.b) implies then that |θ x,s | is integrable for a.e. x. Further, if no labour is supplied, the agent's budget constraint implies that both p C x+s c x,s and w x+s ζ s (spending on consumer goods and spending on leisure) are integrable, since both are non-negative and the sum of their integrals is ≤ M x < ∞. Integrability of w x+s ζ s for a.e. x implies then by lemma 28 that w t is locally integrable, and r t is locally integrable by lemma 7. By lemma 5.c c(e −γt w t , r t ) ≥ p For the last point, lemma 7 implies r t is locally integrable and hence a.e. finite, so, by cor. 4, e −γt w t ≥ sup k g(k), with g(k) def = p Y t f (k) − r t k, and sup k g(k) > 0 a.e. because p Y t > 0 and r t is finite. Thus w t > 0 a.e. Therefore, by cor. 8, there is full-employment. Since labour costs are > 0, one must have Y t > 0.
Proof. Else f (k t ) > 0 ∀t, so Y t > 0 (lemma 12), so K t > 0 by f (0) = 0.
The equilibrium equations
We start with a general characterisation of competitive equilibria of this economy and later focus on a special subclass of such equilibria, the balanced growth ones. (c) A bge is a golden rule equilibrium (gre) if ∀t, f (k t )−Rk t = max k (f (k)−Rk). and Ω =´E s ds.
Comment 17. Recall that in the basic model, zero-profits on the instantaneous production cone forces
Theorem 1. The set of equilibria with p C = p Y = p I is the set of all solutions of the following system that respect the irreversibility constraints (i.e., the aggregate production (Y t − I t , I t , Y t , L t , K t ) belongs to the instantaneous production set):
0 < p < ∞; π t is non-decreasing and constant on t :
, where kf (k) is defined as 0 at 0, by continuity. (4) , and the rental rate of capital, r t , must satisfy lemma 10.a4.
Proof. By lemma 7, p I = p. Start with equation (5) . By lemma 10.a1, p C is locally bounded, so lemma 11 applies, and p C t > 0 for all t, so aggregate consumption is a singleton. Hence, (5) . (7) comes from cor. 2, and (6) is "market clearing," or the technology of the merchandising firms. Lemma 10 implies the rest (using also lemma 4 forĉ).
Conversely, given a solution of those equations, lemma 10 implies the production sector maximises profits, p t is locally bounded and locally bounded away from 0, and M x is a.e. well-defined, finite, and ≥ 0. Hence, all agents have, by lemma 4.c,d,ĉ x,s as unique maximiser in their budget set, and those aggregate to C t by lemma 11.
Remark 18. It follows from the theorem that in the basic model (i.e., with full reversibility), for any equilibrium with K t > 0 ∀t, the price-system p t is C 1 and non-null, so its logarithm has a continuous derivative, (δ−)r t in the terminology of [24] . Note that continuity of r t is the basic assumption of [24] , so the conclusions of this classical paper (relied upon, implicitly or indirectly, everywhere in the literature) are, a posteriori, at least applicable in this case. In general, lemma 4, when re-written for general u, is needed -and much more powerful.
If one has K t > 0 ∀t in the basic model, a direct argument leads to the conclusion, without relying on the full strength of our previous results: lemma 7 implies then ln p t is C 1 , r t being trivially determined since K t > 0, so [24] is applicable; this line of argument leads then directly to cor. 11 below.
Picking equilibria as in cor. 11, however, does not help to understand which equilibria are missed, if at all. Cor. 12 below gives a number of cases where none are missed; that, however, does rely on the full strength of our results.
Corollary 11. The set of equilibria where K t > 0 and p C = p Y = p I , is the set of solutions (respecting the irreversibility constraints
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) of the following system: (a) k → y : The prices then can be computed as follows, using g t def = f (k t ),
Proof. We start by showing that any equilibrium with K t > 0 and p
has to satisfy conditions (a)-(j) and the price equations (1)- (3). Using thm. 1, K t > 0 implies π t is constant in the price equation, so eq. (1) holds with p 0 = e −π0 ; eq. (2) is from lemma 10.a4 using K t > 0, eq. (3) is from thm. 1(4), because k t > 0.
Next, let p x+s = p x ψ(x, s) with ψ(x, s) = exp(δs −´x 
Using the definition of η (= (γ + ν)(1 − σ) + βσ) we obtain now (b)-(h). Conditions (a), (i) and (j) are from (1), (6) and (7) of thm. 1 respectively (with K t > 0).
Conversely, a solution of the system (a)-(j) along with the price equations (1)- (3) and p C = p I = p Y is an equilibrium by thm. 1. Indeed, k t > 0 (from (j)) implies the local integrability of g t , and hence, first (2) in thm. 1, and, second, 0 < p t < ∞ by eq. 1 here, implying then (3) in thm. 1 with π t = − ln p 0 . The equations for wages are identical. Conditions (1), (6) and (7) are from (a),(i) and (j) respectively. Finally, eq. 5 follows now by reversing the above computation. (b): Since p Y = p by lemma 7, it follows from lemma 10.a1 that p C is locally bounded, hence lemma 11 applies. Cor. 10 implies that M x > 0 a.e., so equation (1) of lemma 11 holds everywhere, and with the integral and C t strictly positive, so I t < Y t and all prices are equal (p = p Y = p I = p C ). Since the integral in the definition of aggregate demand (equation (1) of lemma 11) is locally bounded away from 0, and since p C is locally bounded, C t itself is locally bounded away from 0. Thus K t = 0 is impossible: immediately after such a time, it is impossible to have C t bounded away from 0, if f (0) = 0.
(c): We have p C = p Y = p a.e., using lemma 5.b, hence thm. 1 applies. Since i t > 0 by the capital accumulation equation (thm. 1 (7)), we have k t > 0.
(e): K t is exponential iff k t is, and by prop. 1.a, k t is bounded, so constant. Thus K t = K 0 e (γ+ν)t . Since ω ≥ 0, K 0 > 0 by lemma 13. Then, by the capital accumulation equation, I t = RK t is > 0 too, so constraints on disvestment are not binding; so the rest follows by case b.
Comment 19. No Bubbles: To get rid of the solutions of the equation in lemma 7 with (even constant) ς > 0 ("bubbles"), or: indeterminacy) one might expect to need a transversality condition, e.g., lim t→∞ e −δt p t = 0, or infinitely-lived investment firms making arbitrage operations like buying some capital now and renting it out forever after. But thm. 1 (eq. (3)) does imply ς = 0, provided f is strictly increasing: prop. 1.a implies k t is bounded, so inf g t = inf f (k t ) > 0, thus´∞ 0 g t dt = ∞, and hence ς = lim t→∞ e −δt p t = 0.
Comment 20. No Autarcy: The "intellectual reason" why the "0-equilibrium" (where K t = 0 ∀t) doesn't exist is individual rationality: a single Robinson Crusoe with no starting capital can produce output and capital and consumption goods in his lifetime (at least if 1/f is locally integrable at 0, cf. lemma 2 and comment 8), according to the maximal solution of lemma 2 27 where he works full-time and all output is converted into investment. The problem with this "argument" is that if ζ is identically 0 in some initial part of his lifetime, capital (and hence consumption possibilities) will start to build up only after that initial segment, i.e., if σ < 1, his lifetime utility is still −∞: that is why trading is needed with other Robinsons born at different dates, and hence the whole apparatus of equilibrium analysis.
Comment 21. Clearly, all the previous results apply to the reduced economy E considered in section 2.5.3 as well. Since the map E to E is an isomorphism, it maps, in each direction, equilibria to equilibria.
Thus, under the assumptions of cor. 11, in E , individual consumption equals c x,s = B x exp −´x +s x (σr t + η)dt . Further, p t = p 0 exp(´t 0 r s ds) so that −r t is the equilibrium interest rate (net of depreciation) in E . Therefore, the map of the prices is then, with P = p 0 p0 : p t → p t = P e (γ+ν)t p t , w t → w t = P e νt w t , r → r = r.
Balanced Growth Equilibria
It will be shown below that in a bge where k > 0 all quantities of the reduced economy are constant with time, and so will be r = R − f (k). Finding the bge amounts then to solving one market clearing equation for r, or simply k. kr =H Ξ (r), with r = R − f (k) (2) with the rest of the (constant) quantities determined by the following conditions:
and the prices determined by
Remark 23. If f (0) = ∞, any non-negative solution k of (2) is strictly positive. Hence cor. 12.d-e imply that bge of those models are characterised by cor. 13.
Proof. Being exponential and bounded (prop. 1.a), k t is constant, = k. By (a) in cor. 11, y t = y is constant, and (j) there implies i t = i is so. Since Ω t = Ω by definition of bge, equation (i) implies c t = c is constant too.
For any fixed r, conditions (a)-(f) along with (1) of this corollary are equivalent to conditions (a)-(j) (excluding cond. (i)) of cor. 11, for constant quantities. The equivalence of the corresponding price equations is obvious.
Next, cond. (i) of cor. 11 for constant quantities, i.e., i = y + Ω − c, and (c) above imply Ω − c + y − Rk = 0, so, by substituting the rest of the conditions,
which is equivalent to (2), by notation 5.1.
Remark 24. With E ≥ 0, N ≥ 0 ((1) in cor. 13) is always satisfied; and for E = 0, and f (k) = Ak α , A > 0, 0 < α < 1, equation (2) in cor. 13 can be represented as
Remark 25. r is the growth rate of aggregate values (p t C t , p t Y t , p t K t ) in the bge, by eq. (3) in cor. 13, since aggregate quantities grow at rate γ + ν.
5.1.
Example: nonsensical (overinvestment) BGE. In this subsection assume f (0) = ∞ in the basic model. Hence in all bge k > 0 by cor. 12.d. Produced consumption is positive, i.e., y > i, if and only if k < κ, where κ > 0 satisfies f (κ) = Rκ (and so is uniquely defined by ass. 4).
Hence if k ≥ κ the whole production sector works for nothing, or even consumes part of the "manna" Ω; no consumption good ever comes out of it. Corollary 14. In the basic model, for any economy with f (0) = ∞, there is, for any k > 0, a transfer policy E s such that k is consistent with a bge.
Proof. For the given economy take any value k > 0. If r = 0, pick any transfer policy that satisfies cor. 13.1 and use the fact thatH Ξ (0) = 0 by rem. 22 to construct a bge (using cor. 13). Else, pick h ∈ L 1 ([0, 1]) such that´e sr h(ds) ≥ 0 andH h (r)/r > 0 (otherwise there are b 1 , b 2 not both zero, such that b 1Hh (r)/r + b 2´e sr h(ds) = 0 for all h, which implies r = 0). For y = f (k), let z solve zyH h (r) = kr, then z > 0, since y > 0 andH h (r)/r > 0. Let E s = yzh s − (y − kf (k))ϕ s . Then Ξ s = E s + (y − kf (k))ϕ s = yzh s , and by construction of z, and linearity ofH h in h, the market clearing condition (2) of cor. 13 holds. Since´1 0 e rs Ξ s ds ≥ 0, (condition (1)) the initial k along with the constructed transfers are consistent with a bge by cor. 13.
Remark 26. Since y − i = c − Ω and c ≥ 0 ((i) and (e) of cor. 11), a sufficient condition to avoid nonsensical equilibria is to set transfers such that Ω < 0 and that satisfy the equilibrium condition (1) of cor. 13,´1 0 e rs Ξ s ds ≥ 0, (assuring c ≥ 0). Alternatively, one could use pure transfers, Ω = 0, and c > 0. 
, where N , D are defined by conditions (c)−(h) of cor. 11. (c) Inequality (a) is necessary for the existence of a feasible path, at least if
Proof. (a): Since f (0) > R and f ∞ < R, and f is concave, and differentiable at k > 0, there exists k g > 0 satisfying b1. Given k g define the rest of the variables from conditions b2-b7. Then the result follows by point b.
(b): Take a solution of (b1)-(b7). Since
it is an equilibrium. Since k is constant, it is a bge and it is a gre by the concavity of f and condition (b1).
Conversely, take an arbitrary gre, then k > 0 has to satisfy (b1). By the capital accumulation equation in section 2.2.2, (b3) has to hold. Then both k and i are strictly positive. Hence a constraint that investment can not be transformed into output is not binding, so, by lemma 5.b, p I = p Y , and thus lemma 10 applies. Its condition a2 implies (b2). This implies that y > i, since
; so cor. 12.c applies. Thus, the gre should solve the system a-j and the equations (1)-(3) of cor. 11, in addition to p = p
It is easy to verify that conditions (b4)-(b7) here are implied by the first three conditions, (b1)-(b3) (which are consistent with (a), (b), (j) of cor. 11) and conditions (c)-(i) in cor. 11 along with its price equations.
The last part of the statement, (c), follows by the Pareto property of gre [18, thm. 1] implying no feasible aggregate consumption is strictly higher than c g .
5.3.
Examples of bge without transfers for f (k) = Ak α . We plot here eq. (1) of cor. 13, i.e., α 1−α as a function of x = 1 − r/R = f (k)/R = αY t /I t . This way one can find the bges for any α by intersection with the corresponding horizontal line, i.e., solving eq. (1) of remark 24 in x:
With those coordinates, 1) the relevant region is the positive orthant, 2) units are dimensionless, thus easier to interpret, and 3) the functionH ϕ(r) r is analytic (lemma 27), so the graph, more reliable. Figures 1-4 show the bge of economies with ϕ(s) = To illustrate, consider, for example, the economy described in fig. 2 : working period there is from .135 till .5. For α = 1/3 there are two balanced growth (stationary) equilibria: one gre and one pure bge with x = . Surprisingly, using cor. 14, one can construct a nonsensical equilibrium (with ridiculous over-investment) even in this economy by adding transfers. Pick k = 1.1κ, where κ satisfies f (κ) = Rκ (as in sect. 5.1). It can be supported as a bge level of capital if individuals get, e.g., a subsidy of 71% of their wages (say, claims to a natural resource) during their work-years. Although every individual has zero assets at the end of his life, investment is perpetually above the output in this equilibrium (
0.94), so on the aggregate, part of the 'manna' is never consumed! In the reduced such economy prices are rising, marginal product of capital is low and the agents are frantically saving for the old age, but still, the life-time consumption decreases exponentially.
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One could make two general observations based on the graphs. First, Gale's [13] dichotomy, the distinction between gre and other bge, is quite visible and it is made transparent in the next section using his classical net asset criterion. Second, the number of pure bge can be either even or odd. Thm. 3 assures finiteness of bge and provides simple conditions determining their parity.
Gale's dichotomy
We first show that in any equilibrium the amount of net assets, the difference between total consumer savings and the debts of all firms, is constant over time.
To give a meaningful definition of savings we will only consider equilibria where p Y = p I and so, by lemma 10, the "instantaneous savings" of a consumer are locally integrable, and thus the total accumulated savings can be defined as a Lebesgue integral of the instantaneous ones, as we show in lemma 14. 
Remark 27. By lemma 10 consumers work full-time and spend all of their income, so S t denotes their actual savings. p t K t is the total outstanding debt of all firms; indeed, all firms but investment firms are instantaneous, so their debt is zero. Any investment firm f has a finite life-span and its starting value is zero. So by the zero-profit condition its value at any time t is also zero, hence its debt at time t equals the value of its capital,
γ+ν)z e −νs ζ s ] is locally Lebesgue integrable, so S and m are well-defined.
Proof. By lemma 10.a3,
γz p z . By lemma 10.a1, p z is locally bounded, by prop. 1.a, f (k z ) is locally bounded, and since by lemma 5.c, w is non-negative, and also k z f (k z ) ≥ 0, w is locally bounded. Hence, since ζ is integrable, w z ζ s is locally integrable (in z, s). Next, p C is locally bounded by lemma 10.a1, ω is locally integrable by assumption (section 2.1.3), and individual consumption (ĉ x,s ) is locally integrable by prop. 1.c. It follows that h is locally (Lebesgue-)integrable. Theorem 2. m t = m is constant in any equilibrium where p Y = p I .
28 One might rightfully argue that the example is somewhat extreme and may be unrealistic, but could it elucidate the much-debated "paradox of thrift" -this time -in a neoclassical model?
29 Or money, foreign credit.
Proof. By lemma 14, h is locally integrable, so, by Fubini, S t =´1 0´t t−1+s h(z, s)dzds.
Since for any a, b, c, d ∈ ,´b a −´d c =´c a −´d b ,
where the second equality holds because´1 0 h x−1+s,s ds, being the total life-time savings of the individuals born at x − 1, is zero. It follows that S is the primitive (in the sense of Lebesgue integral) of´1 0 h t,s ds, its a.e. derivative, S t . Thus, using the definition of L t , the notation in sect. 2.5.
t−s,s ds = c t L t ) and the formula for h in lemma 14, for a.e. t
Next we show that the firms' debt, p t K t , is locally absolutely continuous.
Take an interval [a, b], let T 0 be its subset where K is zero. Pick > 0. By continuity of K there is δ 0 > 0 such that for any t which is at least δ 0 -close to T 0 ,
and by rem. 14.
Let Q be the closed 
Choose any δ ∈]0, min{δ 0 /2, δ Z }[. Then any finite collection of non-overlapping intervals of total length less than δ can be partitioned into two groups: those that intersect Q ([a i , b i ] i ); and those that do not ([a j , b j ] j , considered above). Since δ < δ 0 /2, the intervals of the first group are in the closed δ 0 -neighbourhood of T 0 , and hence Since S t is absolutely continuous, being a Lebesgue primitive, their difference, m t , is absolutely continuous too.
Next, by lemma 10.a5
Since q t k t is the product of two functions that are a.e. differentiable, the derivative of the firms' debt is
where the last equality holds since π t k t = 0 by lemma 10.a5.
Hence, for a.e. t, the difference, m t , of the two derivatives, S t and
then no output is transformed into consumption, and no endowment is transformed into output, hence output equals investment, so the last summand is zero. The only source of consumption is the endowment, so the first summand is zero as well. Otherwise, by lemma 5.a, p
, which is 0 by material balance (feasibility). Thus, m t = 0 a.e. Since m t is absolutely continuous, it is constant.
Comment 28. Consider all transactions as being paid through individual-or firmaccounts at a single bank, in the numeraire underlying our price system p t (so an interest-free money). Think of all those payments being made on the date of the corresponding physical transfer of goods, and of each account's balance as a function of time. Budget balance implies that only the accounts of currently living consumers or investment firms have a non-zero balance. So the total credit m t extended by this bank at time t is the sum of the balances of all currently living agents. But since any transaction credits one account by the same amount it debits another one, m t is constant over time in equilibrium. Now we give a necessary condition for m to be non-zero, but only for bge.
Corollary 16.
In any bge where k t > 0 and p
either (it is a "pure bge"):
whereH is as defined in notation 5.1 and Ξ is as defined in cor. 13.
Proof. By cor. 15 a bge with r = 0 is a gre.H Ξ(r) r is well-defined for all r by lemma 27. By cor. 13 k, y are constant, and E t,s = E s , c t,s = c s . By cor.13.3,
Then, by the def. 4, and using lemma 14 along with the definition of Ξ s
By lemma 14 the integrand is locally integrable, so by Fubini, the first summand in the brackets is´1 0´t 
With zero transfers, the first case yields the curve in fig. 1-4 , and the second, the vertical.
Remark 30. The two cases described in cor. 16 correspond to Gale's (1973) dichotomy between "balanced" (where m = 0) and "golden rule" equilibria (where m is typically non-zero). Also, whether m in the second alternative is positive or negative determines whether the model is "Samuelson" or "classical" in his terminology.
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7. Finiteness and Parity of bge
Definition 5. q : → converges exponentially at rate almost z (to a limit) if it converges exponentially at rate higher than z − ε for any ε > 0, and not at rate z. Proof. Since f (0) = ∞, by definition ofH h (notation 5.1), its limit as k → 0 is lim r→−∞ (´h s ds − (r)´1 a h e rs h s ds) =´1 0 h s ds − lim r→−∞ (r)´1 a h e rs h s ds.
(a): The statement is equivalent to lim r→−∞ (r)´1 a e rs h s ds = 0, with exponential convergence. Hence, first, by the dominated convergence theorem it suffices to show, that, for σ < s < 1, (r)e rs is bounded uniformly in (r, s) and converges a.e. to 0 as r → −∞. Convergence is exponential, since, by a similar calculation, lim r→−∞ (r)´1 a h e sr h s ds
h +ε a h |h s |ds for some ε > 0. 
For the rate of convergence note that the above inequalities hold for v arbitrarily close to a h (only Z v > 0 is needed). On the other hand,´v a h e sr h(s)ds ≤ e a h r Z v ; so, for sufficiently low r ≤ 0,´1 a h e sr h(s)ds ≤ 2e a h r Z b . Thus:
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Lemma 16. If f (0) = 0, ass. 5 is equivalent to each of the 2 following properties:
Under ass. 5, if h k converges exponentially in |r| to ∞ at rate almost θ > 0 when
Proof. b ⇒ ass. 5: Passing to logarithms, we have ∀θ > 0, ∃k θ , ∃M :
, ∀θ > 0, thus ass. 5. ass. 5 ⇒ a: Since f (0) = 0, ln(f k − kf k ) → −∞, so < 0 for k sufficiently small. Thus, since f (k) > 0 for k sufficiently small, ass. 5 implies ∀M ∃k 0 :
and e θf k in a equals e θ|r| up to a constant factor. ∀ε > 0 and for k sufficiently large, by assumption h k ≥ e (θ−ε)|r| and, by a,
Corollary 17. Assume a ϕ < σ, f (0) = 0, and ass. 5. Then
The convergence is exponential in r at rate almost min{1, σ} − a ϕ .
Proof. Note that ass. 5 and f (0) = 0 implies f (0) = ∞. Use then lemma 15.b and the last statement of lemma 16. 
Comment 31. The case E s ≤ −εϕ s , which plays a rôle only if a E = a ϕ (else it boils down to E s ≤ 0), may seem non-generic. But models where taxing starts when working does, with tax at least an ε-fraction of income, are not that implausible.
Proof. Since the assumptions imply f (0) = ∞, bge correspond, by rem. 23 and cor. 13, to the positive solutions of
Since f is (real-)analytic on ++ , and so areH E andH ϕ by lemma 27, thus G(k) is real-analytic on ++ as well.
and G is not identically zero. Thus its set of positive roots is discrete, and bounded, and the multiplicity of each root is well-defined and finite.
So to prove finiteness, suffices to show that 0 is not a limit point of a sequence of roots. We will thus evaluate the sign of G as k approaches zero. If the sign is negative (resp., positive), the number of roots counting multiplicities is even (resp., odd).
Note that r − − → If Ω = 0, assume first σ < a E . Then the first term in G,H E , converges exponentially (in r) to 0 by lemma 15.a, andH ϕ converges to 1, so the sum of the last 2 terms, which are positive, is of the order of f k − kf k − k(R − f k ) = f k − Rk, i.e., of the order of f k since f 0 = ∞. Suffices thus to show that f k converges slower than exponentially (in r) to 0, i.e., that f k e εf k → ∞ ∀ε > 0, which is by lemma 16.a. Finally, if σ = a E ≤ a ϕ , the first term is − (r)´1 σ e rs E s ds, it converges exponentially to zero by lemma 15.a, and because r < 0, when E ≤ 0 on [σ, σ + ε], it yields a positive term on that interval. Thus, since the other 2 terms are positive, the argument is the same as in the previous case.
Ω by lemma 15.a, (f k − kf k )H ϕ (r) converges to −∞ (by cor. 17), and kr → 0 (cf. supra), so G is negative.
If a ϕ < a E < σ then by cor. 17 (f k − kf k )H ϕ (r) converges to −∞ exponentially at rate almost min{σ, 1} − a ϕ , which is higher than the rate (min{σ, 1} − a E ) of convergence ofH E (to ±∞) by lemma 15.b, hence G is negative (since −kr ≤ ε|r|).
c: Let b = a E + ε. If a E < σ ≤ a ϕ , then by lemma 15.a, (f k − kf k )H ϕ (r) converges to zero with f k − kf k , and by lemma 15.bH E converges to ±∞ depending on the sign of E on [a E , b], so the sign of G is the opposite of that one.
If a E ≤ a ϕ < σ and E is positive on [a E , b], thenH E andH ϕ converge to −∞ and G is negative. If a E < a ϕ < σ and E is negative on [a E , b], thenH E converges faster (at rate almost min{σ, 1} − a E ) than (f k − kf k )H ϕ (r), by cor. 17, hence G is positive. So we get the same conclusion as in the previous paragraph.
And if a E = a ϕ < σ with E s ≤ −εϕ s , then for any
Corollary 18. Assume f is analytic on ++ , f (0) = 0 and ass. 5 is satisfied. If, in addition, E ≥ 0, then the number of bge, counting multiplicities, is odd iff σ ≤ min{a ϕ , a E }, else even.
Proof. By thm. 3, since for E ≥ 0, N ≥ 0, so N is the number of bge.
Comment 32. The number of stationary equilibria is finite in the discrete time exchange models of the literature ( [15] , [13] ) as well. However when the time is truncated at zero, it is claimed to be even, and at least two ( [15] , [3] ), in contrast to our results.
Similarly [2, prop. 3 and thm. 2] imply that there always exists a pure bge in case of Cobb-Douglas production technology and no transfers, thus contradicting our graph 3 exhibiting an economy that has only a gre for all values of α. The graph, in turn, illustrates cor. 18.
Cor. 18 complements the claim in [14] about existence and uniqueness of pure bge when σ ≥ 1 (≥ min{a ϕ , a E }) and when there are no transfers.
Comment 33. If, with stationary endowments, there are non-bge equilibria, then they form a continuum, by shift invariance.
Conclusions
We think of this model as a template for how to do policy analysis in a mostly analytical way. Policy here is expressed in terms of transfers (endowments), i.e., of their distribution across age-groups at each instant of time. We rely only on the most standard definition of general equilibrium, i.e., optimisation by agents, without any ad-hoc assumption, like forcing equilibrium variables to belong to specific spaces, or to be non-zero. Our equilibrium characterisation suffices for the proof in [19] of the validity of comparative statics (i.e., no indeterminacy) in this model. Not all classical results extend, for example, the parity of bge depends on the relative magnitude of the minimal working and tax ages, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Several open questions still remain. First, do there (generically) exist equilibria with stationary transfers that are not bge? Do they all converge to some bge at +∞ and −∞? If so, what is the directed graph induced among bge? Next, what is a complete characterisation of equilibria of the general model, where some irreversibility constraints might be binding? Tackling this question is a prerequisite for handling the several-commodity model of [21] . Finally, is there a generalisation of Gale's dichotomy to all equilibria (with non-stationary endowments), e.g., is Pareto implied by non-zero net assets? The last question is partially answered in [18] : the gre is Pareto in this model.
Appendix A. Aggregation of demand
To aggregate consumption the classic integration of correspondences [1, 8] does not apply, as consumption bundles are equivalence classes of arbitrary +-valued Lebesgue-measurable functions, so do not lie in any vector space. We use the following very close analog.
Notation A.1. Let M (or M to denote the domain) be the set of all equivalence classes of arbitrary +-valued Lebesgue-measurable functions with the topology of convergence in measure on all compact sets, for any fixed distance on +.
The topology is independent of the distance, and is Polish, so the usual measurable selection theorems hold.
Definition 6. Given a measurable space (X, X , µ), the integral of a measurable M-valued function x → Fx is the unique point G in M s.t. ∀p ∈ M,´p(t)G(t)dt =˜p(t)Fx(t)dtµ(dx), with the usual measure-theoretic convention that 0 × ∞ = ∞ × 0 = 0.
The integral of a measurable M-valued correspondence with a.e. well-defined and nonempty values is the set of integrals of all its measurable (a.e.)-selections.
To prove the above is well-defined (and to show how it is used), observe that by Doob's [1953] classical martingale argument, there exists for any such F a jointly measurable function f (x, t) s.t. f (x, ·) ∈ Fx ∀x (use first a homeomorphism of + with [0, 1] to reduce to the case where sup x Fx ∞ ≤ 1). Fubini's theorem implies then that´f (x, t)µ(dx) satisfies the requirements for G. Uniqueness is obvious.
Conversely, given any jointly measurable -valued function f (x, t), F : x → f (x, ·) is a measurable M-valued map. Indeed, assume first f is bounded; then F is measurable to L∞ with the weak*-topology, since bounded subsets there are compact metric. But those bounded subsets are Polish for the topology of convergence in measure on compact sets, so the Borel structure is the same. For general f , approximate it by the sequence fn = max{−n, min{f, n}}, n ∈ .
Note finally that, G being well-defined, it suffices to check the equality in the definition with indicator functions of compact sets for p. e δs (Is−δHs)ds shows that also K is a
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Alternatively, by rem. 4, It − δKt is in L loc 1 , and, if there are no intervening sales, Kt is locally absolutely continuous and a.e. differentiable with It − δKt as derivative, by cor. 2, so that K b − Ka =´b a (It − δKt)dt: It − δKt is net investment. Therefore, Kt + Ht, which is the total amount of capital accumulated by the firm up to time t, including capital already sold and excluding capital bought, must equal its total past net investment,´t(Is − δKs)ds.
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In principle one could equivalently forbid capital transactions; firms would then at the beginning of their life-time build up capital stock by buying investment, and at the end deplete it by disinvesting and selling the investment good. But in the absence of a market for capital there can be no price for capital, so all prices would be prices of flows, and hence only equivalence classes of measurable functions, making the whole language a bit more cumbersome and less transparent. Since further this trick of transferring capital to another firm by disinvesting it and selling the investment good is quite artificial and unappealing, we chose the present formulation.
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Indeed, the initial condition is a technological restriction ("how much coal was initially in the ground"), so it has to be reflected in the production sets. And it is naturally in Z that it has to appear (and not as a time-dependent restriction on how much capital can be used in instantaneous production). Since obviously it has no counterpart in the Z f , which have compact support, it must be implied by the aggreation procedure., i.e., by the concept of integral-and thus ultimately by the choice of the embedding space and its topology. Thus, using a classical approach of integrating firms' production sets makes the treatment a bit more technical (adding the boundedness requirement on the kt, and the semi-norms k L 1 (ν) , and thus leaving the realm of Fréchet spaces), and hides behind abstract definitions of spaces what is now a very clear and explicit economic assumption, the initial condition.
continuous linear function of (I, H). Finally, H +K lies in the closed subspace of absolutely continuous finctions; on this closed subspace, I is a continuous linear function of (H, K).
Remark 36. Recall, a function f with values in a locally convex space E is Bochner integrable iff f takes values a.e. in some separable subspace of E, ϕ • f is measurable ∀ϕ in the dual E , and the upper integral´ * (p•f ) < ∞ for each p in a sub-basis of semi-norms for E. The same holds then for any continuous semi-norm on E, and´f is defined in the algebraic dual of E by ϕ •´f =´(ϕ • f ) ∀ϕ ∈ E . If E is complete,´f ∈ E.
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Thus, to justify the above definition, we must prove P is complete.
Lemma 19. P is a complete locally convex space.
Proof. P being essentially the product of its I and K factors, separate proofs suffice.
For I, this is the space L loc 1 , and results immediately from L1 being a Banach space. For K, since pN is stronger than the sup [−N,N] norm, a Cauchy net kα converges locally uniformly, hence pointwise, say to k. Then pN (kα − k) → 0 follows from the implication yα → y pointwise ⇒ V (y) ≤ lim inf V (yα).
We now prove that k is bounded. Else, up to a sign change, ∀n∃tn : k(tn) ≥ 2 n . Let then νn = i<n 2 −n tn : since νn has bounded support, K →´kdνn is a linear functional φν n on P dominated by some pN , thus, by the above, φν n (kα) → φν n (k). But νn ≤ ν∞ implies that, since kα is Cauchy in · L 1 (ν∞) , the kα are bounded and converge uniformly on the νn: their pointwise limit φν n (k) is also bounded on the νn, contradicting φν n (k) ≥ i<n 2 −n 2 n = n. So k is bounded. Hence, having locally bounded variation, it corresponds to a point in P . Remains to show that kα − k L 1 (ν) → 0 ∀ν ∈ M ( ).
Repeating the previous argument with νN the restriction of ν to [−N, N] shows that φν N (kα) → φν N (k) uniformly in N . And since the kα and k are bounded, limN φν N (kα) =´kα(t)ν(dt) def = φν(kα), and the same for k. Thus φν(kα) → φν(k) ∀ν ∈ M ( ). In particular,´kα(t)f (t)ν(dt) →´k(t)f (t)ν(dt) ∀f ∈ L∞(ν). But the kα are uniformly Cauchy on the unit ball of L∞(ν), so the convergence is uniform: kα → k in L1(ν).
Lemma 20. A subspace of P is contained in a separable subspace iff the K's are all dominated by a single measure-i.e., all discontinuities fall into a single countable set, and the measures represented by the continuous parts belong to some fixed L loc 1 (ν) space.
Proof. Separability of L loc 1 results from that of L1, hence I components are always separable. For K, given a dense sequence one constructs immediately the countable set of discontinuities, and then, from the continuous parts, (locally) the dominating measure ν. Conversely, any such subspace is separable-again the separability of L Proof. Necessity: evaluation at t is a continuous linear functional, separability is by lemma 20, boundedness is because k's in P are bounded, and by lemma 19, implying that´K f t µ(df ) ∈ P , and the variation is locally integrable by definition. F ⊗B( )-measurability: Since K f t has locally bounded variation, it can be decomposed into its right-continuous regularisation, which is F ⊗ B( )-measurable, and the difference, which is non-null only at countably many tn (lemma 20), and clearly F-measurable at each tn; hence the F ⊗ B( )-measurability of K f t , so pN (K f ) is measurable by lemma 17. Sufficiency: For the measurability of any continuous linear functional φ, let φn(k) = φ(k [−n,n] ): since φn → φ pointwise, suffices to prove measurability of φn. Note that, on our separable subspace, φn(h) has the form´hdν +´δ gdh (cf. fn. 38), for some ν ∈ M ( ) and a bounded Borel function g with compact support on δ , because by separability, all measures dh fall into some L1 space on δ ∩ [−n, n], so continuous linear functionals are represented by a bounded Borel function g. The measurability follows then, by first approximating g as an a.e. limit of a uniformly bounded sequence of continuous functions
The proof of [12, thm. 8.14.14 p. 570] holds also in abstract measure theory.
for ε sufficiently small, the new profits are still > 0. Do the same at a. Now Kt = It = 0 outside of (the new) J -so any larger J can as well be used. In particular, take its closure.
Construct now (H f , K f , −I f ) ∈ Z f as in prop. 3, incuding the 'further' clause. Then the assumptions of lemma 22 are satisfied: H f t has locally integrable variation by prop. 2 and lemma 18; pt is µ(df )⊗dH f t -integrable by the further clause, since the locally finite set D intersects the bounded interval J in a finite set, and any function is integrable for a distribution with finite support; the limits like K f b + are trivial and 0. Finally, the quasiintegrability follows too, since K f and I f are piecewise proportional (with pieces which are products) to K and I resp., with the same non-negative proportionality factor. Thus profits are well defined, and aggregate to the positive aggregate profits. Finally, this piecewise aspect implies that f → (K f , I f ) is a simple function, so one the values that it takes (on a set of positive measure) must yield positive profits too. Let (H , K , −I ) be that value.
Observe that this approach is one of "transactions-based" accounting: it is the cash-flow stemming from transactions that is recorded when they occur, and summed.
But the above formulae are pretty cumbersome, and make no sense when K f t has unbounded variation. This is addressed next. B.5. Integration by parts. Assume we know now further (e.g., by lemma 7) that pt has locally bounded variation. Then we want to use integration by parts in the previous formula. To this effect, define the linear functional . Ktdpt, etc.
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F has locally bounded variation: decompose both pt and Kt as differences of 2 positive increasing functions; by bilinearity one can assume both are such. Clearly then F is increasing too.
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One can view ffl as a usual integral: view the linear functional ffl as linear map from functions pt of locally bounded variation to Radon measures dpt on the space τ = { t ∈ } ∪ { t − | t ∈ } ∪ { t + | t ∈ }, τ being ordered in the obvious way (t − < t < t + ), and endowed with the order topology (having the open intervals as basis). τ is locally compact, by standard arguments, and each singleton {t} is open, and has measure 0 under dpt, so the measure has its support in the subspace δ (δ for 2, τ for 3) consisting only of the points t − and t + . δ is locally compact, totally disconnected, and separable, but still the Borel σ-field (equals the Baire σ-field, or that spanned by the intervals, or the inverse images of Borel sets of modulo a countable set) is not separable. δ is the Stone-Čech space of the quotient (e.g., identified with the space of càdlàg functions) of the space bounded functions on converging to 0 at ∞ and having everywhere leftand right-hand limits (i.e., the Banach space (in the sup-norm) spanned by the indicator functions of bounded intervals), by the subspace c 0 ( ) of functions whose left-and right-hand limits are 0.
The conditions on Kt in def. 11 are then exactly those needed for a function K on to extend unambiguously to an equivalence class in L loc 1 for the Radon measure dpt on δ ; and intervals J in are mapped to their inverse images in δ . Everything extends thus to dpt-measurable sets J.
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Indeed, by linearity, suffices first to consider the case where Kt and pt are increasing, next one can decompose both into their continuous part and a sum of jumps part, next, neglecting the tail of the latter, one is reduced to the case where each of Kt and pt is either continuous or a single jump t≥t 0 or t>t 0 . Further, since the value of Kt at points of discontinuity plays no rôle in the formula, we can assume Kt right-continuous, so the integral w.r.t. dKt is a plain Stieltjes integral. Thus, if pt is continuous, all integrals involved are Stieltjes integrals, and the formula is classical for this case. Similarly if Kt is continuous, since then ffl [t,t] Ktdpt = (pt + −pt − )Kt, so the integral is the Stieltjes integral that w.r.t. the right-continuous version of pt -and replacing pt by this version Comment 39. The more is known about p, the more plans can be evaluated this way. For example, if p I = p is locally Lipschitz and lemma 10.a4 holds, then any jointly integrable K f t satisfies the assumptions of lemma 25. Because of this, there is no good reason to require anything more of K in the model than local joint integrability; as a consequence however, this implies that as long as the Lipschitz character of p is not proved, the only arbitrage arguments we can use are that production plans satisfying the stronger assumptions above, would not be profitable.
Comment 40. Even equilibrium prices can have discontinuities and singular parts (as described in thm. 1), so one really needs to allow for any pt of locally bounded variation-if it was continuous, standard integration theory would suffice for the integration by parts.
Comment 41. In applying the above in lemma 7 to obtain the zero-profit conditions on prices, we use for further strength only the most restrictive production plans, of lemma 22.
